Immigration reform proposals would make everyone an illegal until proven not to be.
By LAURA W. MURPHY And FRED L. SMITH JR.
By LAURA W. MURPHY And FRED L. SMITH JR.
The Feb. 3 editorial calling for a national ID card “with effective safeguards for privacy and against government prying” fails to address the most important question. One only has to look at the history of the Social Security number to know that there is no effective safeguard against government identification protocols being put to an ever-growing array of uses.
To find concerns with a national identification system “hollow,” the editorial board ignored important lessons of history. The uses made of the Rwandan ID card, apartheid South Africa’s internal passport, the Soviet propiska and other national ID systems in the past century are not hollow examples. Indeed, they are more flesh-and-blood than many people would like to consider.
Our recent history doesn’t suggest that national ID cards would be put to the worst of uses, but the future is uncertain. An important part of maintaining our essential freedom in this nation is declining to build the technical and social systems that could be freedom’s undoing. Even if federal background checks controlling immigration could be perfected, seeing such a system expanded to monitor and control U.S. citizens is not a price worth paying.
Jim Harper, Washington
Some of the largest inefficiencies in our systems occur because information stored in different government databases is not being shared properly. With the plummeting cost of storing and transmitting data, sharing information has become much more practical. Biometric identification is also helping counties to automatically weed through the fake, duplicate, and fraudulent entries with a speed and precision not before possible. US-VISIT, the Department of Homeland Security’s biometric entry program, has also shown how this technology can scale and be effective in every day usage.
"I don't quite agree with you on Homeland Security's actual competency on something as static as biometric identity. I don't think this entry fitfully explained why we should NOT get a NID system, as towards the idea that it should be a national identity system that bears marked scale improvements. I don't think biometric identity is appropriate at the mass scale you describe here. India rejected is biometric authentication properties, even though it was committed in that direction.
When India dumped the NCTC in December 2012, one of the most alarming problems for national security was that it didn't pass their standards was the authenticate use of biometrics as online identifiers. It was part scale, part problematic for the competency of institutional infrastructures. The main problem for India, was the fact that NATO and it's global partners were coached on how to be RFID and biometric business partners.
This was so they could inject the identity hardware adoption not as general above board businesses, but as a government decision. This would lead to a comprehensive identity tackle for a global ID system, much like the one you describe in your TEDx discussion. I think its time for TEDx to probably give some stage play to the contrapositive argument, volleying both individual soverignty and sovereign state independence from NATO borne identity development schemes. Those are just my thoughts."
Immigration ‘Reform’ Will Turn the US into a Police Statetinyurl.com/bdwegsp
— Ron Paul (@RonPaul) February 4, 2013
For close to two years project development and civc engagement at NIST for the National Strategy for Trusted Identity in Cyberspace (NSTIC) has been delegated to a body known as the Identity Ecosystem Steering Group or IDESG.
While there has been a moderate-to-high levels of concern that this project could evolve into a national ID system, the input has fallen on deaf ears. Two of the first 5 project pilots going out were for biometric online ID cards for smartphone port at US borders and machine readable passport conventions which included biometrics.
While the IDESG has a civic engagement structure, it became very apparent that the group's oversight and development of these programs were not consistent with any concerns expressed over a national ID system. One of the reasons is that the group's organizers are a federated biometric's lobby, Trusted Federated ID.
None of the civic input expressed at these IDESG meetings will fall on accountable grounds. The input good or bad will be fielded by a biometrics lobby. Any input expressed at the IDESG group meetings would not be fielded by an actual government body accountable to the public.
A biometric lobby will only seek its own interests. It should not be in a place to field or invite public input as fake, unaccountable government. This is an egregious conflict of interest.
They and others recruited by their interests at IDESG have been asking the public to attend these meetings and have even been claiming they are a government body by some members.
A conflict of interest complaint has been submitted to the Dept of Commerce, Office of the Inspector General (OIG).
If you contact the OIG, you can express and document a complaints about having a special interest lobby fielding the civic concerns of the US public.
Here is how to contact the office: http://www.oig.doc.gov/Pages/Hotline.aspx
You have to submit a reference number and a PIN to document your complaint.
Your complaint will help get a real civic representative body involved with the IDESG processes so your voice and concerns are recognised in the process. You can help weed out fake government, who only stands to make exclusive profit from a burgeoning surveillance industry. Sincere thanks,